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Abstract
This paper uses a heterogeneous rms model to scrutinize Fair Trades aim to help
the most disadvantaged producers in developing countries. Incorporating important
aspects of Fair Trade in a two-good heterogeneous rm model we show that only
the most productive rms will join Fair Trade arrangements. Higher required pro-
duction standards and entry costs make Fair Trade not viable for low-productivity
rms, despite its advantage of o¤ering direct and secure distribution channels to
international consumer markets. To overcome this selection e¤ect, Fair Trade or-
ganizations may want to reconsider their selection criteria, focussing on a rms
productivity rather than its capacity to adhere to Fair Trade standards.
1 Introduction
Fair Trade can be best described as a movement that applies fairness principles in the
supply chain from poor local smallholders in developing countries to consumers in rich
developed countries. The concept is put to practice by Fair Trade Organizations (FTOs),
replacing middlemen in the supply chain and o¤ering long-term trading relationships.
Fair Trade has known a continuous world-wide growth over the past decades, both in
sales and volume (e.g. Raynolds and Long, 2007). Sales of certied products reached
US$ 4.3 billion in 2010, showing an average growth of more than 30% annually since 2005
(FLO, 2011a). In less than two decades, fair trade has grown from an obscure niche
market to a globally recognized phenomenon(Murray and Raynolds, 2007: 5).
Corresponding author: P.O. Box 9108, 6500 HK Nijmegen, The Netherlands. Tel: +31 24 3615888;
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The aim of Fair Trade is to o¤er the most disadvantaged producers in developing
countries the opportunity to move out of extreme poverty through creating market access
under benecial rather than exploitative terms (Nicholls and Opal, 2005: 6). This is
accomplished by paying local producers a stable, guaranteed minimum price for decent
coverage of production and living costs, as well as by providing them with a development
premium for local projects to improve social, economic and environmental infrastructure.
FTOs charge higher prices for comparable products in rich consumer markets to facilitate
these above market payments.
Economic analyses of the impact of Fair Trade have concentrated on the claims FTOs
make, primarily regarding the alleged e¤ects on income levels of the targeted group and
the e¢ ciency by which this is reached. Theoretical contributions include analyses of the
distorting e¤ects of using price oors as a mechanism to increase local producersincomes
(Lindsey, 2004; LeClair, 2002), the e¢ ciency of fair trade as a vehicle of transferring
income to the poor (Yanchus and De Vanssay, 2003), the e¤ect of privileged market
access for fair trade producers on other producers, locally or abroad (Maseland and de
Vaal, 2008), and the verdict that fair trade outperforms free trade in alleviating poverty
in developing countries (Maseland and de Vaal, 2002). Fair trade has also been assessed
on its potential to eradicate monopsony powers and other market imperfections in supply
chains (Hayes, 2006). De Janvry et al. (2010) point out that the oor prices o¤ered
by Fair Trade are bound to lead to overcertication, eroding the net benet producers
receive from the price premium consumers pay for Fair Trade goods. Finally, a rst
comprehensive empirical study of the e¤ects of fair trade on local incomes is given in
Ruben (2008).
This paper uses a heterogeneous rms model to scrutinize the alleged aim of Fair
Trade to help the most disadvantaged producers in developing countries. We incorporate
important characteristics of Fair Trade in a two-good heterogeneous rm model à la
Bernard et al. (2003), nding that unless specic measures will be taken, Fair Trade
will not succeed in reaching societys poorest producers. In our model, producers decide
whether to produce a Plain Good (PG) or a Fair Trade (FT) good. PG production is the
default mode of entry for any rm entering the market, but after entry producers may
switch to FT production. The special traits of the Fair Trade movement we incorporate
are as follows.1 First, FT products are produced by adhering to better, yet also more
costly production standards. On the other hand, FT producers receive higher prices
for their goods, which consumers of these products in rich countries are willing to pay.
Second, we assume that the decision to start producing FT goods is clouded with some
1Milford (2004) gives an extensive overview of Fair Trade rules for co¤ee cooperatives, indeed featuring
issues like payment of a fair trade premium, access to consumer markets and adhering to minimum
(environmental) standards. See also the Fairtrade International website (www.fairtrade.net).
2
ambivalence on part of local producers. After all, entering a FT arrangement will imply
abandoning familiar production methods and producing for di¤erent markets. We model
these transition costs as an additional entry cost to the one that must be incurred by any
rm that wants to produce. Finally, since Fair Trade also provides a sustainable trading
relationship, it makes it less likely that FT rms are hit by an unexpected negative shock.
Accordingly, we assume that the stochastic survival rate of FT rms is higher than for
PG rms.
Our analysis shows that Fair Trade leads to a selection e¤ect and that it will be the
most productive rms that will join Fair Trade arrangements. The reason is that the
higher production costs will only make FT production a more protable option than PG
production if a rms productivity level exceeds some threshold level. As is standard in
heterogeneous rms models, these rms will then also receive the highest prots. Since
the least advantaged will be those producers with the lowest productivity, this implies
that Fair Trade cannot full its goal to help the most disadvantaged. Furthermore, the
additional entry costs poses a barrier to Fair Trade that matters most for the least produc-
tive producers. The ambiguities involved with adapting to the di¤erent standards of Fair
Trade will increase the selection e¤ect, moving Fair Trade even further away from its goal.
The practice of Fair Trade thus results in a paradox: When Fair Trade succeeds in its
inherent workings better standards, secure trade channels, and so on the consequence
is that it will help the better o¤, not the least advantaged.
We also show how FTOs could improve on their goal of reaching the poorest farmers. A
comparative statics analysis on the key parameters of Fair Trade reveals that the threshold
level of productivity to become a fair trade rm decreases when FTOs would be (better)
able to reduce the ambiguities surrounding becoming a fair trade rm. Furthermore, to
get the less productive rms into Fair Trade arrangements would be helped by a higher
societal preference for Fair Trade goods and by higher standards in non-fair-trade good
production. Nevertheless, as long as Fair Trade is more costly than plain good production,
a selection e¤ect remains and other measures may be required for FTOs to reach the poor.
Finally, we show that it is important that potential rms are aware of the possibility
to engage in Fair Trade before they make their decision to become active as a rm or not.
As we show, if the possibilities of Fair Trade are not known to producers in advance, rms
already producing benet disproportionately in the form of pure prots. In a setting of
poor developing countries with few and dispersed Fair Trade operations, this is not an
unlikely scenario.2 The information e¤ect arises because rms form false expectations
regarding future prots. Weighing the initial entry cost against the net present value
2FLO International (2011b) reports that by the end of 2010 there were 905 Fairtrade certied producer
organizations in 63 countries. The 938 000 farmers these organizations involve world wide compare to
the total number of farm holders in countries like Guatamala and Burkina Faso (FAO, 2011).
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of future prots, new rms are unaware that these could be higher due to fair trade
production. Fewer rms will enter the market, leading to unemployment or a decline in
real wages. Such adverse e¤ects can be prevented by raising awareness about Fair Trade
amongst potential entrants.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 incorporates the key aspects of fair
trade into the demand and supply relations of a heterogeneous rms model. Section 3
elaborates on the entry and exit decisions of rms in view of fair trade possibilities and
Section 4 discusses equilibrium. Section 5 applies comparative statics analysis to verify
what it would take for FTOs to attract low-productivity rms as well. Section 6 focusses
on the importance of having prior information on fair trade for the outcomes. Section 7
concludes.
2 Modelling Fair Trade and heterogeneous rms
Key to the success of Fair Trade is that some consumers have a preference for a category
of products produced by a higher standard, willing to pay higher prices for it. Other
consumers care less or are indi¤erent with respect to such fairness characteristics, seeing
fair trade goods as any other good. We therefore assume that there are two categories
of goods in society, fair trade goods and plain goods, which each yield di¤erent utility to
di¤erent types of consumers. It is convenient to divide consumers in two broad categories.
There is a group of ethical consumers who prefer fair trade goods, while a group of ordinary
consumers would prefer plain goods. These preferences are xed, but not absolute. Ethical
consumers have a relative preference for fair trade goods, but not at every cost. By the
same token, ordinary consumers may also buy fair trade goods.
We stylize this by assuming a representative consumer that values consumption of
both plain goods and fair trade goods as follows:
U =

aCpg + (1  a)Cft
1=
; (1)
where Ci; i 2 fpg; ftg; is a consumption index of di¤erent varieties from either the plain
good category or the fair trade goods category and where  is a CES substitution parame-
ter. This way of modeling is similar to the utility function of Bernard et al. (2003)3. The
parameter 0 < a < 1 is a demand shift parameter, which can here be interpreted as the
3It is also similar to the utility function in Bernard et al. (2010) where consumers have a preference
for varieties of many di¤erent product categories. For our purposes it su¢ ces to only model preferences
for two types of products though. Furthermore, the focus of Bernard et al. (2010) is on productivity and
demand related reasons for multi-product rms to switch products, for which reason they also include
stochastic demand and idiosyncratic demand shocks.
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relative importance the representative consumer gives to plain goods.4 The importance
of fair trade in utility is given by 1  a. In our typology of di¤erent types of consumers, a
would represent the share of ordinary consumers in society and 1  a the share of ethical
consumers. The elasticity of substitution between categories is  = 1=(1   ) > 1. It
is important since even though consumers have clear ideas on which category of goods
they prefer, their actual consumption will also depend on the relative prices of goods from
either product category.
Each product category consists of a multitude of varieties, indicated by the consump-
tion index C:
Ci =
24 Z
!
i
ci(!)
d!
351= ;
where ci(!) is consumption of specic variety ! within the full set 
i of varieties of
category i 2 fpg; ftg produced. Varieties within a category are imperfect substitutes, with
elasticity  = 1=(1   ) > 1. To focus on the di¤erence between categories, preferences
within a category are assumed to be constant and equal for both categories. In other
words, the attractiveness of alternative varieties within a product category is constant and
the same for ethical and ordinary consumers. Furthermore, we will make the standard
assumption that the substitution elasticity within a category is larger than the substitution
elasticity across categories:     > 0.
We denote the price a consumer pays for a product variety by pi(!), The price index
of a particular category of goods becomes:
Pi =
24 Z
!
i
pi(!)
1 d!
351=1  : (2)
Consumers of either category maximize their utility by spending
ri(!) = Ri

pi(!)
Pi
1 
(3)
on each variety !. In this expression, Ri = Ci Pi denotes overall spending on a particular
category. UsingR = Rpg+Rft to denote total expenditures in society, utility maximization
also implies:
4The assumption that a is between 0 and 1 is necessary for having both categories produced.
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Rft
R
=
 
1 a
a
 Pft
Ppg
1  
1 +
 
1 a
a
 Pft
Ppg
1  = K1 +K (4)
with K dened as
 
1 a
a
 Pft
Ppg
1  
. The expenditure share of plain good products is
then 1=(1+K). The importance of the demand shift parameter a in determining societal
expenditure on fair trade goods is clear since dRft=da < 0: the expenditure share of fair
trade goods increases when fair trade products are valued more (lower a). Furthermore,
(4) reects that the preference for the fair trade good and the willingness to pay more for
it are clearly related. In order to keep fair trades expenditure share constant, a higher
price index for fair trade goods must go together with a higher preference for fair trade
goods in society (da < 0) :
dRft = 0() (1  a) da
a
=
(1   )
 
dPft
Pft
:
We now turn to the implications of Fair Trade for the supply side. To begin with, the
desire of Fair Trade to o¤er better trading conditions does imply some extra constraints
on local producers. Requiring certain standards of production is just one of these con-
straints. Other constraints involve becoming part of a cooperative in order to be able to
benet from the fair trade arrangement, implying additional organization and informa-
tion costs (Nicholls and Opal, 2005). Essentially then, becoming part of the Fair Trade
production chain will be costly to rms, a¤ecting variable and xed costs of production.
For instance, the dealings within the cooperative will increase the xed costs of opera-
tions, while having to comply with Fair Trade environmental and labor standards directly
translate into higher variable production costs. On the other hand, Fair Trade also in-
volves clear benets to participating rms. For instance, being part of a democratically
organized cooperative yields counterweight to monopsonic middlemen in the distribution
chain of products (Hayes, 2006). Furthermore, Fair Trade provides a direct and secure
channel for producers to rich Western consumer markets. These benets, however, seem
to relate more to the decision to enter the fair trade arrangement, rather than a¤ecting
production decisions directly (see the next section). We therefore model fair trade as be-
ing more costly to produce than plain goods, using a parameter s to mark the di¤erence
(mnemonic for standard).
Accordingly, the production function for rms producing fair trade varieties and plain
good varieties is given by:
li('; s) =

f +
qi(')
'

si (5)
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for i 2 fpg; ftg and where we assume sft > spg > 0:5 The production function gives
the total amount of labour l that is required to produce output q of the variety the rm
produces. There are increasing returns to scale at the rm level due to a xed cost of
production f . The variable costs of production are normalized to one, but depend on the
productivity of the particular rm, denoted by ' > 0. Since sft > spg, a rm in fair trade
requires higher labour input than an equally productive rm in plain good production.
We will assume that once rms have decided for which category they will produce
their products, they cannot switch to the other category (see next section). Mixed-rm
strategies are therefore ruled out. This makes sense in view of the fact that fair trade
production requires di¤erent standards and a di¤erent organizational arrangement than
plain good production, so that switching to a di¤erent mode of production would require
new xed costs. We will also assume that rms that produce fair trade products cannot sell
these products without the Fair Trade label. That is, should demand for fair trade goods
be insu¢ cient, we deny them the possibility to dumptheir fair trade products on plain
goods markets. For our analysis this is not restrictive, since we only consider situations
where demand for fair trade goods equals its supply. We note however that in view of the
limited size of the Fair Trade market, in practice it is quite common for producers in Fair
Trade programs to also sell part of their products on plain good markets.6
We also assume that wages are equalized across both sectors, assuming a perfectly
working labour market. Furthermore, the wage rate will serve as numéraire in our model,
that is: w = 1 henceforth. This is consistent with the idea that the very nature of
the work remains the same (e.g. working on the land), despite the fact that working
practices will be di¤erent in fair trade production from those in plain good production.
Furthermore, equal wages across sectors is consistent with the idea that the presence of
Fair Trade arrangements will bring labor markets closer to that of an ideal economy, where
wages reect productivity and not the exploitative powers of monopsonic middlemen in
the supply chain of agricultural produce (Hayes, 2006). Finally, having equal nominal
wages in both sectors is also consistent with the aspect of Fair Trade that it pays (more)
decent wages: ceteris paribus a rms production and productivity level, the higher labor
standards of fair trade production imply fair trade labour receives wages that lie above
their marginal productivity.
Firm prots are then given by
i = ri  

f +
qi(')
'

si
5At a later stage we will show that assuming that the di¤erence in standards is the same for both
xed and variable costs of production does not qualitatively a¤ect our results.
6This is at the heart of the analysis by de Janvry et al. (2010). There producers certify for Fair Trade,
yet sell most of their production volumes outside Fair Trade markets.
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and, using (3), prot maximization leads to the familiar outcome that price is a xed
mark-up over marginal cost:
pi(') =
1

si
'
: (6)
Ceteris paribus, the price for fair trade products is higher than for plain good prod-
ucts, while within each product category, more productive producers charge lower prices.
Consequently, there is no need to introduce a guaranteed minimum price for fair trade
producers in the analysis.7 Furthermore, we assume that these prices are c.i.f. prices for
reaching foreign markets because that is eventually the relevant comparison for local
producers. Any di¤erence in costs of reaching far away markets between fair trade and
plain good producers could be easily incorporated, but we ignore it because it would serve
a similar function as the di¤erence in si.
Given the pricing rule, rm prots and rm revenue can be written as:
i =
ri(')

  fsi and ri(') = Ri

si
'Pi
1 
: (7)
As standard in the heterogeneous rm literature, rm revenues and prots are increasing
in productivity levels:
ri('
0)
ri(')
=

'0
'
 1
> 1;8'0 < '. (8)
As such, it is immediate that the least well-o¤among producers (in either category) would
be the least productive rms. Whether a rm of (low) productivity is better o¤ under
fair trade than under plain good production is not clear:
rft('
0)
rpg(')
= K 

'0
'
 spg
sft
 Pft
Ppg
 1
: (9)
However, for equal mass of fair trade rms and plain good rms, revenue and prots
would be lower for fair trade producers unless a large enough share of consumers has a
preference for fair trade goods:
rft('
0)
rpg(')
=
241  a
a
 
Mpg
Mft
  
 1 sft
spg
'
'0
1  35 (10)
for ' = '0 and where we used (2) and rmsoptimal pricing rule (6).
7The price fair trade producers receive is higher than what plain good producers get. The xed
mark-up rule ensures that rms will always be able to cover their labour costs of production.
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3 Productivity and the decision to enter Fair Trade
The essence of entry and exit of rms is as in standard heterogeneous rm models. That
is, rms learn about their productivity once they have entered the market and then decide
to produce or not, depending on whether or not their productivity yields positive prots.
This basic mechanism is the same for all rms, irrespective of whether they will end up
producing plain goods or fair trade goods. Even though fair trade production has an
ethical concern, its main aspect is still protability (Nicholls and Opal, 2005; Moore,
2004). We assume that this also applies to the decision of rms within which category
of goods they will to produce: a rm will choose the category that yields the highest
prots. In our set-up this will involve a comparison of future prots of both product
categories. This is di¤erent from Bernard et al. (2003), where the decision for which
category to produce depends on single period prots. The reason is, as we will argue,
that fair trade production is characterized by a higher probability of survival, while it also
involves additional entry costs. This creates a gap between the outcomes of a comparison
based on single period prots and a comparison based on expected future prots.8
It is a standard feature of the heterogeneous rms literature that rms can be hit by
an exogenous shock leading to bankruptcy. The possibility of such a shock is modeled
into a probability of exit (i.e. chance of death) for rms (Melitz, 2003; Bernard et al.,
2003). We argue that the chance of rms facing a bad shock is smaller within the fair
trade category than within the plain good category. This makes sense in view of Fair
Trades aim to engage in long-term relationships with local producers, but also because
fair trade arrangements guarantee minimum prices and are likely to provide better access
to nancial markets. Hence, letting 0 <  < 1 denote the chance of death for a plain good
rm, we assume:
ft = Xd
with 0 < Xd < 1 denoting fair trades relative chance of death.9
Becoming a fair trade rm also involves several transition costs. These costs can be
material, for instance the costs of learning a new production method. But also immaterial
costs are involved, like ambiguity regarding an unfamiliar arrangement. For instance,
joining a Fair Trade cooperative implies a change towards a di¤erent organization of the
8For the same reasons, it sets our analysis apart from the framework o¤ered by Bustos (2011). To
investigate the e¤ect of regional trade agreements on technology upgrading, she assumes that rms can
reduce their marginal costs of production by paying a higher xed cost. There are however no additional
entry costs, while the technology upgrade also does not a¤ect the exogenous market survival rate.
9When presenting this paper, people objected that one might as well assume Xd > 1, for reason that
Fair Trade mainly relies on demand in low-growth, high-income markets, making its producers more
vulnerable to adverse demand shocks. This is a valid point, but we nevertheless believe that overall the
likelihood of being hit by a negative exogenous shock will be less for a fair trade rm than for a plain
good rm.
9
supply chain. Farmers will leave the classical buyer system, where a monopsonic buyer
would visit the farmer once a year to settle prices and production quantities. Despite
its drawbacks, this system at least provided certainty to the farmer, something the new
system still has to show. Especially for farmers who are at the margin of survival such
ambiguity may be too much to bear, by lack of suitable fall-back options (Nicholls and
Opal, 2005). Furthermore, joining the Fair Trade cooperative implies farmers will have to
adjust their production method, for instance towards more sustainable ways of production.
This also gives rise to ambiguity, especially when it would imply switching from growing
a crop that your grandfather grew to a higher-priced crop that no one in your village has
ever grown before(ibid: 19).
We model these transition costs as an additional entry costs eft that must be faced
by each farmer that decides to become a fair trade producer. These entry costs are xed
and do not change over time. Adjusting to what it takes to become a Fair Trade farmer
is a process any farmer has to go through, no matter the experiences of other farmers
with Fair Trade.10 The fair trade entry costs should be seen separately from the general
market entry costs e, also time wise. However, both entry costs have in common that
they become sunk once incurred.
Our assumptions imply that the decision to enter the market and which type of goods
to produce can be seen as a three-step procedure. First, each potential entrant calculates
an expected value of future earnings, which is a probability-weighted average of the po-
tential earnings of becoming a plain good rm and a fair trade rm. The rm enters if
this value exceeds the entry costs e it must pay to become a rm. Second, the rm learns
about its productivity level and calculates whether its productivity level could sustain
protable production. If this is not the case, the rm will exit. Third, and related, the
rm determines which type of good to produce. It bases this decision on a comparison
of prots of plain good and fair trade production, taking into account the formers lower
probability of survival and the latters additional entry costs eft.11
The rst calculation rms make is to list under what conditions production will be
protable. Irrespective of the category a rm will choose, rms must earn non-negative
prots. This denes a production indi¤erence value of productivity ' for either category
10Not modelling a learning e¤ect is consistent with the absence of a learning e¤ect for plain good entry.
Furthermore, the inclusion of a learning e¤ect would complicate the analysis considerably, since it could
imply rms would want to postpone their entry. Assuming eft is xed over time rules out such potential
time inconsistency problems: for any rm with ' > ' there is no point to stall their entry as a Fair
Trade rm.
11We therefore see entrant rms as rational entities that are able to make all sorts of what-if calculations,
basing their decision what to produce on a comparison between their actual productivity level (which
they nd out about once they have incurred the entry costs) and the what-if schemes they constructed.
Though this may seem too far-fetched, especially in a developing country setting, it aligns the analysis
to standard practice in the heterogeneous rms literature.
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below which rms would not produce:
ri('

i )

 fsi (11)
for i 2 fpg; ftg. This is the standard outcome that operational prots should at least be
equal to a rms xed cost of production. A priori it is not clear which category has the
lowest value of '. We know that for su¢ ciently low levels of productivity ft(') < pg(')
holds: ft(0) =  fsft < pg(0) =  fspg, as sft > spg. However, it will depend on
the elasticity of  with respect to ' which category shows positive prots rst when '
increases. However, as we will explain below, 'ft  'pg.12
The second calculation is to derive conditions that determine which type of good to
produce. Once a rm knows its productivity, and provided condition (11) for protable
production holds, this decision depends on whether the expected di¤erence in future
prots between fair trade and plain good production is equal or higher to the additional
entry costs of fair trade. Expected future prots are obtained by taking the net present
value of all future prots, correcting for the chance of death:13
Fpg('  'pg) =
1

pg(') and Fft('  'ft) =
1
ft
ft('): (12)
Let ' represent the productivity value where the di¤erence between future prots
of a fair trade rm and that of a plain good rm is just equal to the cost of entering the
fair trade market. This marks the point of indi¤erence for a rm between production
methods, yielding a category indi¤erence productivity value:
ft('
) = Xdpg(') + fteft: (13)
We will assume that in the case of equal protability, the rm will become a fair trade
rm. The di¤erence in chance of death lowers the required di¤erence in prots for being
indi¤erent between production methods (Xd< 1), the higher entry costs raise it. The
nondeductible character of the additional entry cost means that it is not part of the
single period prot function, for which reason eft is presented as a separate term in the
comparison between future prots. A lower chance of death for a fair trade rm has a
similar e¤ect as a higher productivity level in the sense that it makes it easier to pay the
entry cost for fair trade production.
Given that there are preferences for ordinary goods and for fair trade goods in society,
equilibrium requires that both product categories must be produced. This puts constraints
12It is theoretically possible to have 'ft = '

pg.
13In line with Melitzoriginal model, time discounting of future prots is not implemented as the chance
of death has qualitatively a similar e¤ect (Melitz, 2003: 1702).
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on the cut-o¤ points identied in (11) and (13). First, it implies that 'ft  'pg. Suppose,
for arguments sake, that the ordering is reversed. This is possible when fair trades prot
elasticity to ' exceeds that of plain goods prots by a large enough margin. By (12), also
the elasticity of future fair trade prots will be higher than that of plain goods prots.
This implies that not only rms with 'ft  ' < 'pg would want to become a fair trade
rm, but also rms with ' > 'pg. In such a situation, no rm would decide to become a
plain good rm, rendering equilibrium impossible.14
Second, 'ft  'pg does not guarantee that producing fair trade goods is the preferred
option for some values of '. A su¢ cient condition for the existence of ' is that the
elasticity of fair trade future prots to ' exceeds that of plain good production. This
requires:
dFft=d' > d
F
pg=d'() drft=d' >
ft

drpg=d'
which, using (7) and (4), is equivalent to:

ft

Pft
Ppg
  
spg
sft
 1
>

a
1  a
 
: (14)
To have fair trade production requires a preference for fair trade products and that the
cost of producing fair trade must not be too high. The lower chance of death works
to increase the likelihood of fair trade production, as expected. The condition is also
consistent with the formal requirement for 'ft  'pg, see the appendix. Note also that if
' exists, it must be that: ' > 'pg.
Proposition 1 To have both plain goods and fair trade goods produced in equilibrium
requires: i) that the zero-prot cuto¤ productivity of plain good production 'pg is lower
than the zero-prot cuto¤ productivity of fair trade production 'ft, and ii) that condition
(14) holds.
If condition (14) holds, there will be a value ' = ' beyond which rms prefer
to produce fair trade goods.15 This implies that high-productivity rms self-select in
becoming fair trade rms, whereas low productivity rms produce plain goods. Dening
'  'pg then gives:
14Unless the additional entry cost of fair trade would be extremely high, as can be veried from our
graphical representation below.
15To see this formally, we evaluate relative future prots in this point. Let '0 > '. Then for the
category indi¤erence condition (13) to be true, Fft('
0) > Fpg('
0):
1
ft
rft('
0)

  1

rpg('
0)

>
1
ft
fsft   1

fspg + eft:
Assuming (13) holds and using (7) to get rc('0)=rc(') = ('0=') 1, it follows that
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Proposition 2 When both types of goods are produced, rms with productivity ' < ' <
' will produce plain goods and rms with productivity '  ' will produce fair trade
goods.
The situation that arises is depicted in Figure 1 below. The horizontal axis lays
out productivity levels, the vertical axis represents single period prots or future prots,
depending on the curve portrayed. These are the what-if schemes each potential entrant
calculates prior to learning its productivity. Figure 1 is drawn such that the single period
prot lines of the two categories converge, which is however not required for the analysis
to hold. To have both categories produced, expected future prot lines must converge
though. They always start at i(') = 0 (i = pg; ft), as rms with negative prots in
a single period go out of business. The di¤erence in slopes between future prot lines
and single period prot lines is due to the ratio of death. Given the di¤erence in survival
rates, the slope of the future fair trade prots curves diverges more from the single period
prot line than is the case for plain good production. Entry costs for fair trade can be
introduced by means of a shadow line below Fft('), as if they were a one-time-for-all
additional xed costs. The indi¤erence productivity level ' is then at the intersection
of this shadow line with Fpg('). This point lies to the right of 

pg, and is for positive
prots. Note however that actual prots earned are not represented by the shadow line,
since eft becomes sunk once it has been incurred.
We also note that, as depicted, the productivity level that sustains fair trade produc-
tion yields higher single period prots for plain good producing rms: pg(') > ft(').
Though this could be di¤erent, it is consistent with the inclusion of other elements in the
decision on which type of product to produce than just di¤erences in production stan-
dards. The required jump in future prots at ' highlights the trade-o¤ between facing
lower prices but certainty with plain goods production, versus the ambiguity of switching
to Fair Trade, despite the outlook of a better price. The di¤erence in single period prots
at ' could be interpreted in a similar way: to be on the safe side, rms are willing to
face lower prots today.
(Insert Figure 1 about here)

'0
'
 1 
1
ft
rft('
)

  1

rpg('
)


>
1
ft
rft('
)

  1

rpg('
)

:
should hold, which is the case since '0 > '.
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4 Equilibrium
Given that entrants know what would be optimal to do once knowing their productivity,
they may calculate expected lifetime earnings and confront these with the entry cost for
starting up a rm, including the possibility of additional entry cost for fair trade produc-
tion. To make this assessment, rms need information on the probability of the alternative
options upon entry (direct exit, plain good production, fair trade production). In this
section we deal with this in the standard fashion of the heterogeneous rm literature,
as in Melitz (2003). In a later section we verify the consequences of having incomplete
information, for instance regarding the possibility of engaging in fair trade prior to entry.
We assume an ex ante probability density function of productivities g(') and asso-
ciated cumulative distribution function G('). It follows that the ex-ante probabilities
of successful entry, plain good production and fair trade production are, respectively,
1   G('), G(')   G('), and 1   G('). Taking into account that the distribution
changes due to the exit of rms, the ex post probability distribution of productivities in
either category become:
('pg) =
g(')
G(') G(') and ('ft) =
g(')
1 G(') : (15)
This determines average productivity levels in each market, which can be used to
calculate aggregate variables. Average productivity only depends on the productivity
distribution g(') and the cut-o¤ points (Bernard et al. (2003):
~'pg('
; ') =

1
G(') G(')
Z '
'
' 1g(')d'
1= 1
(16)
~'ft('
) =

1
1 G(')
Z 1
'
' 1g(')d'
1= 1
(17)
where a tilde above a variable denotes an average value. Since fair trade rms are rms
with '  ' it follows that average productivity in fair trade is higher than in plain good
production: ~'ft > ~'pg.
With full information about all options available, prior to entry the expected value of
the rm is the probability weighted average of ~pg = pg(~'pg) and ~ft = ft(~'ft), taking
into account the respective rates of survival. Entry stops when this value is equal to the
expected entry costs:16
16By using (12) we could also have written the equation in terms of average future prots ~F .
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e =
G(') G(')

~pg +
1 G(')
Xd
~ft = e+ [1 G(')]eft. (18)
Since this model deals with two types of rms, the costs of entry are separated between
the general entry cost of becoming a rm, and the additional entry cost of becoming a
fair trade rm. The latter carries a probability since only rms with productivity higher
or equal than ' will decide to become fair trade rms, which is not clear ex ante.
As customary we will assume steady state equilibrium of entry and exit. This means
that for every type of rm that exits a similar kind of rm enters. Let Mpg and Mft be
the mass of rms of plain good rms and fair trade rms respectively, denoting entrants
to the market with Me. Steady-state equilibrium then implies
Mpg = [G('
) G(')]Me and XdMft = [1 G(')]Me: (19)
The probabilities in (19) reiterate that rms decide on which type of rm to become after
they have entered. Ceteris paribus, the relative incidence of fair trade rms increases if
Xd goes down, if the threshold for protable production ' goes up and if ' goes down.
The model is closed by assuming that the labor market clears. Labor is the sole
input in our model and all revenue earned must be paid to labor. Since the wage rate
was set to one (numéraire), this implies L = Le + Lp = R, where Le and Lp denote
labor used for entry and labor used in production, respectively. Total prots earned are
 = Mpg~pg +Mft~ft, which in equilibrium should match the costs of entry else more
rms would desire to enter. Thus:
Lp = R   and Le = :
Le includes the additional entry costs for those rms that decide to become a fair trade
rm:
Le =Mee+ [1 G(')]Meeft
and labour market equilibrium implies:
Mpg~pg +Mft~ft =Mee+Me[1 G(')]eft: (20)
The model can be reduced to a system of four equations that can be solved for the
endogenous variables ', ', Ppg and Pft. To solve the model, we follow Bernard et al.
(2003) in terms of procedure. First, we combine the expression for relative rm revenue (9)
with the category indi¤erence condition (13). Then, using rpg(') = ('=') 1rpg(')
from (8) and applying the zero-prot cut-o¤ condition (11), we get:
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
'
'
 1
=
sft
spg
+
Xdeft
fspg
 Xd
1  a
a
 
Pft
Ppg
  


spg
sft
 1
 Xd
(21)
which is larger than one since ' > '. By (14) the denominator is positive. It is clear
that disadvantageous cost and price developments for fair trade - for instance sft up or
Pft=Ppg down will increase the minimum productivity requirement for becoming a fair
trade rm relative to what it takes to protably enter the market. By the same token, this
also holds for a decrease in the relative expenditures of fair trade Rft=Rpg.17 A decrease in
the relative advantage fair trade producers have regarding the exogenous chance of exiting
an increase in Xd is likely to increase '=', but this cannot be settled denitely. We
will come back to these and other issues in the next section, but intuitively this can be
explained by means of Figure 1, where a change in Xd would not only rotate the curves
depicted, but also shift them.
The relative price index ratio can be expressed as:
Pft
Ppg
=

Mft
Mpg
1=1 
sft
spg
~'pg
~'ft
=
" R1
' '
 1g(')d'R '
' '
 1g(')d'
# 11 
sft
spg

1
Xd
 1
1 
(22)
where we applied (19) and the expressions for average productivity (16)-(17). Logically,
the price index ratio is increasing in fair trades relative labour standard by the xed
mark-up pricing rule. Likewise, a higher average productivity for fair trade products
decreases its relative price ratio. When fair trades relative chance of death Xd lowers,
its price ratio will decline because fewer rms will exit, ceteris paribus entry. We note
that with ' > ' and Xd < 1 it is not clear whether fair trade goods carry higher
prices, despite sft > spg. Though one of the central tenets of the fair trade movement is
that consumers pay higher prices for goods that are produced under fair circumstances,
the self-selection of high-productivity rms in fair trade arrangements makes that this is
neither necessary, nor required.
The next step is to express (18) in relative prices and cut-o¤ points. Using (10), (8),
17Using (4), the denominator can be rewritten to
Rft
Rpg

Pft
Ppg
 1


spg
sft
 1
 Xd.
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and (11), while applying the expressions for average productivity (16)-(17), we get:
~pg =
"
~'pg
'
 1
  1
#
fspg
~ft =
"
1  a
a
 
Pft
Ppg
  
spg
sft
 ~'ft
'
 1
  sft
spg
#
fspg:
Upon substitution, the free entry condition (18) becomes:
fspg

"Z '
'
"
'
'
 1
  1
#
g(')d'
#
+
fspg
Xd
Z 1
'
"
1  a
a
 
Pft
Ppg
  
spg
sft
 1
'
'
 1
  sft
spg
#
g(')d' (23)
= e+ eft
Z 1
'
g(')d':
Equilibrium conditions (21) and (22) combined determine a unique value of relative goods
prices and the relative cut-o¤ point.18 Together with equation (23) and (20), they solve
for ', ', Ppg, and Pft.
5 What does it take to reach the poorest farmers?
By Proposition 2 we have seen that Fair Trade arrangements are bound to attract the
more productive rms in society. This begs the question: what would it take for Fair
Trade Organizations (FTOs) to come closer to their goal of reaching the poorest farmers
in developing countries? To investigate this we perform a comparative statics exercise
on the parameters in the model over which FTOs can be expected to have some control.
These are the additional entry cost eft associated with the entry of fair trade rms and
the reduced chance of post-entry failure of fair trade rms compared to their plain good
producing counterparts: Xd = ft= < 1. Furthermore, the relative production cost
disadvantage of fair trade production (due to higher standards, sft=spg > 1) and societys
relative preference for fair trade goods (1 a)=a are important parameters in determining
the potential success of Fair Trade. The issue of completeness of information will be taken
18From equation (21) it follows that Pft=Ppg is monotonically declining in '=':  >  >
0, noting that the denominator of (21) is positive. It ranges from a value of Pft=Ppg =
[sft=spg +Xdeft=(fspg)]
1=(  )
[a=(1  a)] =(  ) (sft=spg)( 1)=(  ) > 0 when '=' = 1 to a lower
value of Pft=Ppg = Xd [a=(1  a)] =(  ) (sft=spg)( 1)=(  ) > 0 when '=' goes to innity. From
(22) it follows that Pft=Ppg is increasing in '=', ranging from zero if '=' approaches one to innity
if '=' approaches innity. This proof is in line with Bernard et al. (2003).
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up in the next section.
To facilitate the analysis we follow Bernard et al. (2003) and assume productivities
' are distributed according to a Pareto-1 distribution: g(') = aka' (a+1), with a and
k parameters that are both greater than zero. The associated cumulative distribution
function is G(') = 1  

k
'
a
. This implies that ' 1g(') is also Pareto-distributed.
Dene h(')  k' (+1), with   a    + 1 and   aka = and assume a >    1.
The distribution of ' 1g(') then follows h('). The cumulative distribution function of
h(') is H(') = 1 

k
'

.
In the Appendix we report what this implies for the equilibrium conditions that were
established before. Here we concentrate on outcomes of changes in eft, Xd; a, sft and spg:
The key equation for all comparative statics results is:

'
'

  1
 1 1 
1
Xd
 1
1 
=
(
'
'
1  
sft
spg
+
Xdeft
fspg
 Xd

+Xd
) 1
  
a
1  a
  
  


sft
spg
   1
  
(24)
This equation has been obtained by combining (21) and (22), applying the Pareto-
distribution. It denes a unique equilibrium for '='.19
Totally di¤erentiating (24) with respect to eft, Xd; a, sft and spg gives:
d

'
'

= Q1deft +Q2dXd +Q3da+Q4dsft +Q5dspg (25)
where Q1 > 0; Q2 ? 0, Q3 > 0, Q4 > 0, and Q5 < 0 are shorthand notations for
expressions that are given in the appendix. This equation is key to understanding how
the models endogenous variables change when exogenous variables change. Take for
instance an increase in the entry costs of fair trade: deft > 0, ceteris paribus. Referring
to the appendix for calculation details, by (25) this will unambiguously increase '='.
This in turn implies that also Pft=Ppg increases, which follows directly from (22) once the
Pareto-distribution is applied:
d(
Pft
Ppg
)=
Pft
Ppg
d

'
'

=

'
'
 = 
   1
24

'
'


'
'

  1
35 > 0:
Furthermore, by equation (11) it follows that also ' must go up, implying that ' will
19The left-hand-side of (24) is monotonically increasing in '='. It ranges from zero at '=' ! 1
to innity when '=' ! 1. The right-hand-side is strictly decreasing in '='. It ranges from a
value greater than zero at '=' ! 1 to a smaller yet positive asymptote when '=' !1.
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go up by even more. Finally, the steady-state conditions for entry (19) imply:
Mpg
Mft
=

'
'
a
  1

Xd (26)
so that d

Mpg
Mft

=d

'
'

= a

'
'
a 1
Xd > 0 as well.
These e¤ects are all as expected, implying that if FTOs want to attract rms with
lower productivity, a decrease in the entry costs is warranted. Recall in this respect that
the entry costs for Fair Trade were introduced in the model to parameterize the transition
costs of becoming a Fair Trade rm, including learning costs of adopting new production
methods and the ambiguity of moving into something new. Hence, increased FTO e¤ort
in assisting local farmers to make the transition could tip the balance for producers with
productivity marginally below ' towards becoming a fair trade producer. Also for rms
in the higher productivity range, the lower entry cost will make fair trade production a
more attractive option and more rms will enter. The lower fair trade entry costs also
requires a lower productivity to enter the market as a plain good rm: the expected costs
of entry decrease, requiring a lower expected prot as well. Finally, with more yet less
productive fair trade rms around, the price index of fair trade goods decreases.
Analogous reasoning can be applied to understand the implications of other changes
that make it less attractive to become a fair trade rm, for instance an increase in a
or sft, or a decrease in spg. By (25), these changes have qualitatively the same e¤ect
on '=' as an increase in eft.20 Consequently, attracting the less productive rms
into Fair Trade arrangements would be helped by a higher societal preference for Fair
Trade goods and relatively lower Fair Trade standards. The former would call for an
intensication of awareness campaigns in consumer markets of these goods. The latter
would call for exerting pressure on local governments to raise standards in non-fair-trade
good production, presuming that it is not an option for FTOs to lower their own standards.
Proposition 3 Lower Fair Trade market entry costs, higher consumer preferences for
Fair Trade products and lower Fair Trade production standards decrease the required pro-
ductivity level ' to become a Fair Trade rm.
Another instrument for FTOs to inuence ' is the relative advantage fair trade rms
have over plain good rms in surviving exogenous market shocks. Recall Xd  ft=, so
that an increase in Xd implies a lower advantage for fair trade rms in this respect. The
20The results on changes in standards remain qualitatively the same if we would assume that the
di¤erence in standards is di¤erent for the xed cost of production than for the variable costs of production.
This can be directly inferred from (24), noting that the standards in [sft=spg +Xdeft=fspg  Xd] refer
to di¤erences in standards regarding xed costs, while (sft=spg)
  1
  refers to di¤erences in standards in
variable costs.
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e¤ect of a change inXd is unclear however. On the one hand, an increase inXd would make
it less attractive to become a fair trade rm, implying '=' should increase. On the other
hand, an increase in Xd also has a direct impact on '=' by the steady state equilibrium
condition (26). Ceteris paribus, an increase in Xd works to increase Mpg=Mft, making it
more attractive to become a fair trade rm. This would lower '='. An ambiguous e¤ect
on '=' results, impairing an assessment of the implications of an increase in Xd on the
other endogenous variables as well. However, we show in the appendix that an increase in
Xd will more likely increase '=' the smallerXd and the smaller ( 1)(  ). Enjoying
a high (initial) advantage of fair trade production in terms of survival and a low extent
of substitution between fair trade product varieties both imply that the negative e¤ects
of an upward change in Xd are felt harder.21 For FTOs this implies that a continuous
e¤ort to maintain or improve the securing of distribution channels is warranted. It also
raises concerns about the tendency towards the mainstreaming of distribution channels
by FTOs, which is likely to lead to an increase in Xd.22
Proposition 4 The more secure market demand is for Fair Trade products and the lower
the extent of substitution between Fair Trade goods, the more likely an increase in the
relative advantage of Fair Trade in surviving exogenous market shocks (a decrease in Xd)
will decrease the required productivity level '.
6 Incomplete information
A key aspect of our modelling set-up is that potential market entrants know of the possi-
bility of Fair Trade prior to their decision to enter the market. This section discusses the
consequences when potential entrants are unaware of this option and would only learn
about the possibility of engaging in fair trade after they have entered as a plain good rm.
In a setting of poor developing countries with few and dispersed Fair Trade operations
(see section 1), this is not an unlikely scenario. This leaves the decision to stay in the
market and/or to become a fair trade rms in tact once rms have entered they get to
21It also implies that our results hold for values of Xd higher than one. In that sense our assumption
that Xd < 1 is not critical for the results we derive.
22Mainstreaming is dened as the step-by-step introduction of market channels at various stages of
the supply chain (Raynolds, 2009). Originally, FTOs  then known as alternative trade organizations
 functioned almost completely outside conventional trade channels, organizing trade and distribution
through alternative structures, such as world shops. Only consumption was organized along market lines.
The foundation of Max Havelaar in the Netherlands in 1988 marks the beginning of using conventional
distribution channels to sell fair trade products to consumers (e.g. supermarkets). A further step in the
mainstreaming process has been the move towards certication, allowing commercial companies to enter
the market for supplying fair trade goods (Renard, 2005). Finally, by now some FTOs also leave the
relations with producers of raw materials to the market, provided they meet certain standards (e.g. Utz
Certied).
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know that fair trade is an option but clearly it has consequences for the initial decision
to enter the market or not. Without knowing about the possibility of fair trade, the free
entry condition would become:
 0e =
G(') G(')

~0pg +
1 G(')

~0pg = e. (27)
where we use a "0" to indicate variables that might change due to wrong information. The
notable di¤erence between (27) and the original free entry condition (18) is the absence of
average fair trade prots, as well as the absence of the expected entry costs of fair trade.
Moreover, average prots may change, depending on the implied changes in price indices.
The values for the cut-o¤ points ' and ' remain the same: the what-if schemes of
the previous section become known once rms have entered and found out about their
productivity.
Without prior knowledge of fair trade production possibilities the expected value of
a rm will decrease: v0e < ve. To see this it is key to understand that without the right
information potential entrants will base their ex ante calculations on a version of Figure
1 that only includes (future) prots for plain good rms. Hence they believe protability
to be lower than it will actually be, expecting a lower mass of incumbent rms. To see
this formally consider Figure 2 below. The gure depicts the expected value of entry as
a negative function of the number of incumbent rms.23 The full information scenario
is depicted by M , at the intersection of ve and e + (1   G('))eft. Having limited
information implies lower expected entry costs, and, as we will show, a lower value of the
rm. To make the argument we draw ve(~' = ') as a special case for the full information
scenario, giving the value of the rm if the net benet of fair trade to the average rm
just matches the additional entry cost. Logically, if fair trade does not bring additional
benets, the number of rms is invariant to having the right information or not. Hence,
the curves for the incomplete information scenario must also intersect at M 0. Since e <
e + (1   G('))eft, it must be that v0e < ve(~' = '), as depicted by the dashed lines.
Clearly, average productivity of fair trade will exceed ' and hence ve will be higher than
this borderline case, resulting in v0e < ve and M
0 < M:
(Insert Figure 2 about here)
The consequence is that when fair trade is not anticipated, fewer rms will enter the
market than is required for labor market equilibrium. With a xed overall labor supply,
this implies either unemployment of L   (L0e + Lp) > 0, or a decline in real wages that
23Average prots decline in the number of rms: d~i=dPi = (   1)(~i + fsi)=Pi > 0 and dPi=dMi =
1
1 Pi=Mi < 0.
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ensures that Lp increases to match the decline in Le. In either case, the relative position
of laborers in society deteriorates. When unemployment arises this would manifest itself
through a portion of the labor force receiving no wage income at all, as well as through
excess prots that will arise for rms. With real wages unchanged Lp, R and  are the
same as before, implying   L0e > 0. When the adjustment occurs through a decline in
real wages, total prots fall to L0e, which matches the required entry costs. These adverse
e¤ects can be prevented by announcing the possibility of fair trade to potential entrants.
Proposition 5 Local labor markets will be adversely a¤ected by the existence of Fair
Trade if potential producers are not aware of the possibility of engaging in Fair Trade
arrangements prior to making their entry decisions.
7 Conclusion
The moment fair trade arrangements are introduced, the more productive rms in society
would want to switch to fair trade production. Though confronted with an additional
entry cost, besides higher costs of production, for them the benets of a higher rate of
survival are highest. Fair Trade clearly entails a selection e¤ect. While reaching out to
help the least well-o¤ in society, the rms attracted to the arrangement are the larger,
more productive rms.
This conclusion is reached in a framework where rms di¤er in their productivity and
where Fair Trade is portrayed as a sustainable alternative to ordinary production arrange-
ments, both in terms of labor standards as well as in terms of enduring partnerships. The
paradoxical results is that when fair trade succeeds in its inherent workings, the benets
will go to the wrongset of producers. Whats more, when the possibility of fair trade
is not commonly known to new rms prior to entry, too few rms will enter leading to a
real wage decline and/or excess prots for incumbent rms.
Fair Trade Organizations (FTOs) could take measures to decrease the threshold level
of productivity required to become a fair trade rm. The lowering of fair trade entry
costs, raising awareness amongst consumers and exerting pressure on local governments to
increase the standards in plain good production, would all help in this respect. However, to
fundamentally resolve these issues may require unorthodox measures. When productivity
di¤erences between rms exist, higher standards and the existence of transition costs mean
there is no way to escape from the selection e¤ect. One solution could be to set a maximum
prot level for those rms FTOs want to include. This would at least make Fair Trade
unattractive for the most productive rms, though it is not clear what it would imply for
the level of productivity required to protably enter fair trade arrangements. Another,
more direct solution is to strengthen the admission criteria to fair trade arrangements:
22
FTOs may want to (re)consider which rms they allow to enter the partnership. To
counter the selection e¤ect a strong selection policy may be warranted, focussing on a
rms productivity rather than on a rms capacity to adhere to the requirements of Fair
Trade arrangements.
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A Mathematical derivations
A.1 Consistency of '-condition and 'ft > '

pg condition
To determine a condition for 'ft > '

pg, we use (9) and (11) to obtain:
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Hence, 'ft > '

pg if: "
Pft
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  # 
spg
spft
 
>

1  a
a
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The condition for existence of fair trade production (14) can be written as:

ft|{z}
>1

sft
spg

| {z }
>1
>

a
1  a
 
Pft
Ppg
   
spg
sft
 
:
If 'ft > '

pg holds then the right-hand-side of this equation is at least twice the value of 
a
1 a
 
. The left-hand-side is clearly larger than one, as indicated. Both conditions are
therefore consistent.
B Comparative statics results
Assume productivities ' are distributed according to a Pareto-1 distribution: g(') =
aka' (a+1), with a and k parameters that are both greater than zero. The associated
cumulative distribution function is G(') = 1  

k
'
a
. Furthermore, dene h(') 
k' (+1), with   a    + 1 and   aka = and assume a >    1. The dis-
tribution of ' 1g(') is then h('). The cumulative distribution function of h(') is
H(') = 1 

k
'

.
Applying this, equilibrium relation (22) becomes:
Pft
Ppg
=

'
'

  1
 1 1
sft
spg

1
Xd
 1
1 
(A.1)
Labor market equilibrium (20) becomes:
Mpg~pg +Mft~ft =Mee+Meeft

k
'
a
: (A.2)
Equilibrium equation (21) remains unchanged but it is helpful to rewrite it into:
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Inserting this in (A.1) gives equation (24) in the main text.
Inserting

Pft
Ppg
  
from (A.3) in the free entry condition, (23) can be rewritten to
(solving for the integral terms on the LHS is not very illuminating):
fspg

"Z '
'
"
'
'
 1
  1
#
g(')d'
#
+
fspg
Xd
Z 1
'
"(
'
'
1  
sft
spg
+
Xdeft
fspg
 Xd

+Xd

'
'
1 )
  sft
spg
#
g(')d'
= e+ eft
Z 1
'
g(')d':
which could be rearranged to, by using (24):
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Totally di¤erentiating (24) yields, after rearranging:
d

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= Q1deft +Q2dXd +Q3da+Q4dsft  Q5dspg
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which is positive.
To see the e¤ects of deft > 0, we use (25) to get d('=')=deft > 0. From (A.1) it
follows that:
d(
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Rewriting (11), using (3), gives R
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The denominator of the left-hand-side decreases, requiring

ppg(')
Ppg

to increase for the
equation to remain holding. Since ppg(') is the minimum value of the price index
Ppg, d

ppg(')
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=d' > 0 and ' must go up. Equation (19) implies, after invoking
G(') = 1 
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It is straightforward to verify that the results for da > 0; dsft > 0 and dspg < 0
are qualitatively the same to those of deft > 0. By (25), all these changes imply an
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unambiguous increase in '=' causing similar e¤ects on Pft=Ppg and Mft=Mpg as well.
Regarding the e¤ect of dsft > 0 and dspg < 0 we note however that d(Pft=Ppg) also
involves a direct e¤ect, which however reinforces the e¤ect d('=') has on d(Pft=Ppg):
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By contrast, a change inXd leads to an ambiguous e¤ect on '=', obstructing nding
clear e¤ects for the other variables as well. For Xd to have a positive e¤ect on '=',
requires the numerator of Q2 to be positive:
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Using (A.3) to substitute for the starred term in this equation yields:
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The sign of the rst term is unclear but we know that
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, for else the starred term would be negative. Hence, the condition can be
written to, dening Con as an arbitrarily chosen constant > 0:
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:
All terms in this expression are positive. Furthermore both sides of the expression may be
smaller or greater than one. Among other things, the condition is more likely to hold the
smaller Xd, increasing the LHS of the equation, and the smaller (   1)(    ), lowering
28
the conditions RHS.
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Figure 1. Productivity cut-off points 
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Figure 2: Expected value of a firm 
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